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EDITORIAL



Álvaro de Vasconcelos DIRECTOR

AFTER THE LISBON TREATY: GLOBAL EU ?

If the Lisbon Treaty is ratified it will put foreign and security policy back at the heart of the EU debate. In that debate institutional implications such as the new post of "EU foreign minister" will likely feature prominently, but the future scope and content of EU foreign and security policy will surely dominate. Already President Sarkozy of France has proposed revising the European Security Strategy, a document agreed by EU governments in 2003.

Foreign policy is indeed a core issue. If the Union fails to collectively address the many challenges it faces in its neighbourhood, some Member States might fall back onto their own national policies, at a heavy cost to EU unity. The Convention on the Future of Europe made foreign policy a priority when drafting the constitutional treaty in 2003 – the foreign policy parts of which the EU heads-of-government maintained when they approved the reform treaty at the European Council summit in Lisbon in October.

The magnitude of the challenges in Europe's neighbourhood show just how crucial this is: Russia and the Caucasus are close neighbours, and Central Asia is not far beyond; Turkey borders Iran, Iraq, and Syria; plus the whole of North Africa and the Middle East

form part of Europe's neighbourhood. Some of the world's most intractable conflicts are on Europe's periphery, including the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israeli-Arab conflict; the aftermath of the war in Iraq; the tensions that rack Lebanon; Iran's nuclear ambitions; and the increasing strains between parts of the eastern neighbourhood and an ever stronger Russia. Africa's dilemmas and conflicts, beyond Chad and the Sudan, affect Europe and the EU's Mediterranean neighbours. A large part of global energy supplies are also concentrated within Europe's wider neighbourhood.

If the Union is to take a leading role in easing tensions and resolving conflicts in its neighbourhood, it must be more than a regional power: it must go global. Indeed, the future

The Council of the European Union



Javier Solana and Jiechi Yang


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*The European Foreign &
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Informal European Council, Lisbon, 18-19 October 2007

of Europe and its neighbourhood will depend on the degree to which the Union is able to reshape world order.

The best tool the European Union can muster in its neighbourhood continues to be its policy of inclusion through economic integration and political conditionality. This has already helped to consolidate peace and democracy from Portugal to Russia's borders. However, as prospects for future accessions recede, so its continued success becomes hazier. Much greater coherence is needed between the EU's "soft power" – the attractiveness of its model – and an adequate dose of "hard power" namely its growing capacity to use military force.

In the 1990s, the stabilisation of Central Europe and the conflicts in the Balkans could be addressed through a combination of European Union soft power and US hard power. Today, this is no longer feasible. The world has changed, and even with the end of the recent transatlantic estrangement, Europe and America's combined power is insufficient to address the global disorder. The critical role of China, Russia and India in addressing the challenges posed by Iran or Darfur demonstrates the changing nature of global politics.

As an EUISS study for the Portuguese Presi-

dency shows, in different ways and areas the new world players are crucial to giving globalisation a human dimension – as proposed by the former Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso. In pursuing this goal, the Union must move well beyond the post 9/11 anti-terror paradigm and place humanitarian tragedies, like the ones unfolding in the Middle East, and poverty in Africa on the global agenda. Equally, it must work with democratic powers such as India, Brazil, and South Africa to build a new agenda to support democracy and human rights, the absence of which hampers human development and breeds radicalisation in many parts of the world.

Emerging powers must have their due, and the Union must seek their partnership to resolve shared global problems. This calls for engaging in a dialogue about what "effective multilateralism" really means.

The world has become multipolar as emerging powers are active well beyond their own borders. The Union must thus engage in strategic dialogues with new players, without neglecting ongoing ones with its Mediterranean and Eastern neighbours, and obviously the United States. However, there is a danger of promoting bilateralism at the expense of regionalism, or worse, bilateral alliances between Member States and emerging powers. In addition, regional initiatives towards the East or the South may also exclude the Union as a

whole. This could compromise the Community side of EU foreign policy – precisely the one that has put democracy and human rights on the agenda.

Emerging powers must have their due, and the Union must seek their partnership to resolve shared global problems. This calls for engaging in a dialogue about what "effective multilateralism" really means. This might not be an easy task. Some global partners regard multilateralism as an instrument to "contain" the most powerful global players and thus to restore a "balance of power" system. The EU has a more benign view of "effective multilateralism", regarding it as a vital tool for tackling regional and global challenges including threats to world peace.

Both the EU and the US are well advised to abandon any kind of "West versus the rest" bipolar vision. Whether based on a rationale of confrontation or of alliance, such a bipolar approach nurtures cultural reductionism which interprets the future of mankind as belonging to "civilisational" actors. Human beings are not enslaved to one allegiance, a given civilisation or a single identity. They are able to share with their fellow citizens a common vision and a sense of solidarity: in short what the nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen calls a "global identity".

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: IS THERE A WAY FORWARD?

Just weeks before the planned international conference in Annapolis, on 29-30 October the EUISS hosted an expert seminar in Washington DC on the prospects for the Middle Eastern peace process. The purpose of this event was to have a transatlantic dialogue between experts and policy practitioners on the key questions for a negotiated solution; Palestinian politics including the role of Hamas; the regional context - especially the role of Iran - and the respective roles of the EU and the US in promoting the peace process. The conference speakers included, among others, Martin Indyk, Shibley Telhami, Ambassador John Bruton, Ambassador Afif Safieh, Rob Malley and Aaron David Miller.



Marcin Zaborowski, Shibley Telhami, Martin Indyk

ESDP, CRISIS PREVENTION & CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

On 23 October, the EUISS co-hosted a high-level seminar in Lisbon with the Portuguese Ministry of Defence on "ESDP, crisis prevention and conflict resolution in Africa". The event brought together representatives from EU governments, the EU institutions, the UN, the African Union, ECOWAS, and selected European and African academics to debate the role of the EU in African security. The topics discussed included the convergence of European and African security interests; rule of law and political control of the African security sector; and the concepts of ownership and responsibility in EU-African co-operation. Speakers included Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Said Djinnit, Claude-France Arnould, Ibn Chambas, General David Leakey and Béatrice Pouligny amongst others.

THE EU AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN GEORGIA

On 15 October, the EUISS held a seminar in Paris on "The EU and Conflict Resolution in Georgia". The event was organised in collaboration with the office of Ambassador Peter Semneby, EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus. The Commission was represented by Hugues Mingarelli, DG Relex, responsible for European Neighbourhood Policy and relations with Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. The seminar brought together civil society actors and experts

from Georgia and the breakaway regions, as well as from the EU and Russia. Discussions focused on the current situation in the conflict regions and possibilities for the EU to engage in confidence building and conflict transformation.

SINO-EUROPEAN DIALOGUE ON SECURITY

On 24-25 September in Paris the EUISS and the Asia Centre co-hosted the second Sino-European Dialogue on Security. The event was also supported by the Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The purpose of this conference was to discuss issues of shared security concerns. The discussion focused on crisis management and crisis prevention, non-proliferation in the Korean Peninsula, promotion of stability in Africa, and the transparency of EU and Chinese defence policies. Speakers included François Godement, Zhang Buren, Rosemary Foot, Feng Zhongping and Pierre Lévy.



François Godement, Feng Zhongping, Álvaro de Vasconcelos

THE WESTERN BALKANS - FORWARDS, BACKWARDS, SIDEWAYS?

This meeting of the EUISS Task Force on the Balkans, which was held at the Institute on 20 July 2007 in Paris, brought together EU officials and experts from both EU Member States and from the Western Balkans region. The purpose of the seminar was to assess the situation in the region in light of the new government in Serbia, the impasse in the Kosovo status process, and the challenges ahead in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the start of the new OHR/EUSR's mandate.

DARFUR: ANALYSING THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

On 9 July, the EUISS organised a brainstorming seminar in Paris entitled "Darfur: analysing the humanitarian crisis". This seminar was convened to understand the humanitarian crisis in Darfur in all its complexity, and to determine how the EU can act more effectively in such circumstances in the future, to prevent such humanitarian disasters from happening again. Participants included experts from European and American think-tanks, as well as representatives of the EU institutions, the Portuguese Presidency and the Foreign Ministries of Member States.

PIONEERING FOREIGN POLICY: THE EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES

Giovanni Grevi
Chaillot Paper n° 106 – 10/2007

Over the last ten years, EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) have pioneered EU foreign policy in countries and regions of direct interest to the Union. EUSRs are a face of the Union, enhancing its visibility, and they give it a voice, seeking to deliver a single message to local and international partners

LESSONS LEARNED FROM EUROPEAN DEFENCE EQUIPMENT PROGRAMMES

Jean-Pierre Darnis, Giovanni Gasparini,
Christoph Grams, Daniel Keohane,
Fabio Liberti, Jean-Pierre Maulny and
May-Britt Stumbaum
Occasional Paper n° 69 – 10/2007

This *Occasional Paper* explores the issue of European armaments cooperation. Such cooperation between countries has often been difficult. Even so, European governments continue to collaborate on multinational equipment programmes for a number of reasons, and successful multinational programmes have manifold benefits.

SEEING BLUE: AMERICAN VISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Esther Brimmer
Chaillot Paper n° 105 – 09/2007

For six decades the United States has supported European integration, yet many Americans have an ambivalent attitude towards the European Union. American views of the EU influence transatlantic relations and shape options available to policymakers. Some Americans see the EU as the culmination of historic efforts to ensure peace, stability and democracy on the continent, while others consider the Union an elaborate scheme to create a rival to US hegemony.

RELATIONS IN THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE-EU TRIANGLE: 'ZERO-SUM GAME' OR NOT?

Vsevolod Samokhvalov
Occasional Paper n° 68 – 09/2007

Both Moscow and Brussels have repeatedly stated that their respective regional projects in the Post-Soviet Space are not competitors. This *Occasional Paper* - which analyses the geoeconomic, geopolitical and socio-cultural dimensions of relations in the Russia-EU-Ukraine triangle - suggests that these relations represent a kind of 'zero-sum game'.

THE ECONOMIST**25 October, 2007****Bosnian politics: Cracking up**

Western diplomats have shelved the idea of closing down Mr Lajcak's post [High Representative in Bosnia]. Russia has not, and in November Russia's agreement in the Security Council will be required to renew the mandate for the remaining 2,500 EU peacekeeping troops in Bosnia. A fight may be in the offing. And even if Russia agrees to the renewal of the mandate, the broader outlook for the region is not hopeful. Judy Batt of the [EU's Institute for Security Studies](#), who is working with Mr Lajcak, says that "politics in Bosnia and Serbia now mean that the EU perspective for the whole region is dying."

ORF.AT**23 October, 2007****Druck auf AK-Partei**

Der Türkei-Experte Walter Posch glaubt, dass das Militär und allen voran Generalstabschef Yasár Büyükanit mit ihrer vehementen Forderung nach einem Einmarsch im Nordirak eigentlich politische Ziele verfolgen. Konkret wollten sie Druck auf die gemäßigt-islamistische AK-Partei ausüben und zeigen, wie schwach diese hinsichtlich der Verteidigung der nationalen Ehre sei. Für Walter Posch vom [Institut für Sicherheitsstudien](#) in Paris stehen politische Gründe und psychologische Kriegsführung hinter dem massiven Truppenaufmarsch in der türkisch-irakischen Grenzregion. Eine Konzentration von 200.000 Soldaten in der Osttürkei, wie türkische Medien berichten, sei ein "beachtlicher Einsatz für 3.000 Kämpfer", sagt Posch. "Da stimmt was an der Rechnung nicht". Da gehe es darum, dass die kurdische Regionalregierung im Nordirak zu unabhängig sei. Deutlich wurde dies an der Weigerung des kurdischen Regionalpräsidenten Massud Barzani, PKK-Kämpfer zu verhaften und an die Türkei auszuliefern.

LE MONDE**3 October, 2007****L'heure de la Chine**

Lors d'une rencontre entre des politologues chinois et européens, la semaine dernière à Paris, à l'[Institut d'études de sécurité de l'Union européenne](#), les Chinois ont expliqué l'engagement nouveau de leur pays et les principes qui doivent l'encadrer. "La non-ingérence ne signifie pas l'indifférence", a déclaré Xu Weizhong, directeur des études africaines à l'Institut chinois de relations internationales, mais la participation de la Chine à des missions de maintien de la paix ne

peut avoir lieu que dans le cadre des Nations unies - où Pékin a un droit de veto - et les interventions doivent tenir compte des souhaits des acteurs locaux. Dans le cas des Etats défaillants, a renchéri son collègue Feng Zhongping, spécialiste de l'Europe, la Chine rejette l'idée américaine du "changement de régime". Le plus important, dit-il, n'est pas l'organisation d'élections, mais le développement économique. Et dans ce domaine, les Chinois ne sont pas seulement demandeurs de ressources énergétiques. Ils ont quelques idées qui peuvent intéresser les Africains.

FINANCIAL TIMES**27 September, 2007****China tested by unstable neighbour**

Chinese academics at a Sino-European dialogue in Paris this week repeated the mantra that China puts development before democracy. But they also admitted that growing experience of operating conditions in Africa has caused Chinese officials to start discussing issues such as the rule of law, corporate social responsibility and institution building. Neighbouring Burma is far more sensitive for Beijing than distant African states but there are similar signs of growing frustration with the regime, as much for its incompetence as for its brutality. "China is changing its identity from being a spectator to being an actor," said Professor Feng Zhongping, director of the Institute of European Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, at the Paris seminar, hosted by the [EU Institute for Security Studies](#). "Now it increasingly realises its responsibilities outside China." He insisted that his government rejected "regime change" in the way the US had ousted Saddam Hussein. "China thinks the most important thing is not to organise elections but to help develop the economy."

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE**23 August, 2007****Bickering between NATO and EU hampers training of Afghan police**

The plethora of different police training schemes was criticized last month in a report by the defense committee in the British Parliament. It concluded that so many approaches "prevented the necessary leadership, coherence and strategic thought and assistance from the international community." Eichele admits that harmonizing the training is a major challenge. Another is the weak rule of law. "There is a clear realization that the police mission in Afghanistan must have a

strong governance aspect," said Giovanni Grevi, a security expert at the [EU's Institute for Security Studies](#) in Paris. "You need to set up strong policing structures at all levels."

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE**26 July, 2007****Shaping the agenda of Poland's drift to the far right**

It is not only religion and morals that form the core of the League of Polish Families. The party has inherited anti-German and anti-Semitic views from Roman Dmowski, a staunch nationalist who played a leading role in Polish politics after 1918. "Dmowski argued that Poland should be a state of and for the Poles," said Marcin Zaborowski, a Polish expert at the [European Union's Institute for Security Studies](#) in Paris. Dmowski argued that certain minorities, particularly Jews and Germans, should be encouraged to emigrate because they could not be easily assimilated.... Indeed, since taking power nearly 20 months ago, Kaczynski has done little to build a strong conservative party. Instead, he has tried to purge the public administration of former Communists or alleged Communist informers to reduce the Democratic Left Alliance, the successor to the Communist Party, to political irrelevance. His coalition includes the two most Eurosceptic and nationalist parties in Poland: the League of Polish Families and the populist, left-wing party, Self-Defense. "Jaroslaw Kaczynski has been taking bits and pieces from both these parties," said Zaborowski. "By flirting with these parties, he wants to weaken them and win over their supporters in the belief he can eventually govern alone without them." But this policy has alienated moderate Law and Justice voters, and, Zaborowski said, "Kaczynski's party is losing the center ground."

THE IRISH TIMES**19 June, 2007****Irish troops prepare for EU mission**

Since January the EU has two battlegroups on standby for six-month periods in case of the need for rapid deployment to tackle a security or humanitarian crisis. The battlegroup concept represents an extension of Europe's capabilities. The first ESDP mission was in 2003. Now there have been 17 or 18 operations," says Daniel Keohane, of the [EU Institute for Security Studies](#). "Most operations have not included military personnel but have been civilian with judges, police or other civil experts deployed. This shows that the EU is in the business of peace-building."



HOW THE RISING POWERS VIEW THE EU

In the multipolar world that is starting to shape the 21st century, the EU's role and influence will depend, to a large degree, on its relations with the rising powers. After the US, Russia and China will be the countries that matter most to the EU. Its ties with Russia will be crucial for the continent's security and energy supply. The EU-China relationship promises great wealth for both parties but, if mishandled, could tilt the world towards greater protectionism. A third rising power, India, currently trades less with the EU than Russia or China do, but that could change in the long run.

Both Russia and China view the EU as a potentially important factor in a multipolar world. Both would welcome the EU becoming a more effective actor in foreign and security policy, so long as it asserted its independence from the US. Both lament that today's EU is unwilling to do so.

Yet perceptions of the EU in Moscow and Beijing are very different. Many Russian politicians and analysts like to criticise the EU, sometimes sneeringly. They find EU institutions both weak and complicated. Russian diplomacy tends to respect strength: in recent years Europeans have tended to be more sympathetic to Russia than Americans, yet Russians have more respect for the US, because of its military power and forcefulness. Being a very "modern" power – in the sense of sovereignty-conscious, as opposed to the sovereignty-pooling "post-modern" EU – Russians respect other modern powers, like the US.

Few Russians understand the importance of the European Union's institutions in its decision-making. When Russia's rulers have a problem with the EU, they generally try to sort it out by calling the leaders of big countries. But on issues such as trade, visa rules and energy policy, they find they have to talk to the European Commission. Russians find it galling that it is much harder to put pressure on the Commission than a national government. The fact that small countries have a lot of influence on EU decision-making upsets the Russians even more.

The EU's enlargements of 2004 and 2007 have made Russians more critical of the Union. Its territory has expanded into countries (such as the Baltic states) that were recently in the Soviet sphere of in-

fluence. Countries that the Russians perceive as anti-Russian have joined the EU and started to influence its foreign policy. Now that Russia and the EU have become close neighbours there is more for them to squabble over – including their common neighbourhood. Many Russians see countries such as Ukraine as part of their own backyard and think the EU has

argued for closer ties to the US, as a hedge against the growth of Chinese power. Indians tend to see the EU mainly as a trade bloc, rather than as a force in foreign policy. That is hardly surprising, given that on the two strategic questions that matter most to India – its putative deal with the US to end its nuclear isolation, and its bid for a seat on the UN Security Council – the



José Manuel Durão Barroso, Vladimir Putin and José Sócrates

no business getting involved in them. China takes a more benign attitude to the EU. Like the Russians, the Chinese find its institutions complex and difficult to deal with. But the Chinese have made a bigger effort to understand them. In Beijing, the leading think-tanks contain scores of experts on how the EU works. Such expertise is much harder to find in Moscow think-tanks.

Like the Russians, the Chinese try to foment divisions among the EU's biggest states, when it suits their purposes, but they pay more attention to the smaller ones. Like the Russians, the Chinese can play a hard diplomatic game – they recently cancelled meetings with Germany, because Chancellor Angela Merkel met the Dalai Lama. But their public style is softer, and seldom contemptuous of the EU. China's leaders take a long view. They are prepared to wait for the EU to become a more independent-minded pole.

India's leaders tend to be less interested in the EU than the Russians or the Chinese. Their big geopolitical debates focus on India's position relative to the US and China. Thus in recent years some analysts have

EU has proved incapable of forging a common position.

Some of the more perceptive Indian analysts have noted that EU foreign policy is developing, for example on the question of Iran's nuclear programme. And on Nepal the EU has worked with India to foster peaceful and democratic change. On Burma, however, India and the EU do not see eye-to-eye. The EU supports sanctions and the cause of Aung Sang Su Kyi. India argues that engagement is the best way to persuade Burma to reform and, though a democracy, has been less critical of Burma's generals than China. That small example suggests that the world's various poles will not always align on the basis of their political systems; perceptions of self-interest will determine who befriends whom.

Thus, for their various reasons, the rising powers tend to see the EU rather like many Europeans do: institutionally complex; economically powerful; and as a force in global affairs, rather unimpressive. But some of those with a long-term perspective, notably in Beijing, think the EU will grow in geopolitical stature.



THE EUROPEAN UNION – AN INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOOD



Two founding fathers of the EU: Jean Monnet & Robert Schuman

The process of European integration represents something new in international relations. The novelty of the European Union is what makes it an international public good. This is because the European process of integration is a silent response to well-known problems in the international system, in which war and peace traditionally alternate. In effect the Europe that was created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 has been able to do three things: capture and bring forth the common interest; administer and assuage inequalities of power and resources; and peacefully settle disputes and resolve conflicts of values.

The handling of these three sets of problems has been the result of voluntary decisions taken by neighbouring countries, which previously had a turbulent history of tensions and wars. It was, therefore, an integration that was not the consequence of a hegemonic imposition, of the type motivated by the diverse aspirations of historic figures such as Charlemagne, Philip II, Napoleon and Hitler. European integration is linked to the values and aspirations of “Europeanism”, which promotes a more united Europe, while respecting its Member States, peoples and individuals. It is an evolution based on a Kantian reading of the international system. In the 19th century this kindled the romantic ideal of a fraternity of the European peoples, as articulated by figures such as Victor Hugo and Giuseppe Mazzini.

Former Portuguese President Mario Soares, when evaluating the Treaty of Rome on its 50th anniversary earlier this year, made the point that the most fulfilled utopian ideal from the second half of the 20th century is today’s Europe, which is both peaceful and prosperous. The “founding fathers” of the European process of integration combined idealism and realism. They constructed the notion of a “European interest” linked to the “national interest” of their countries. They had lived through the dramas of Europe in the first half of

the 20th Century, and as a political response to those tragedies they underlined the importance of the rule of law and of human rights in building the new Europe. They were humanists of either a socialist or a Christian democratic lineage, and in that sense they inspired the political parties that subsequently led the process.

The “founding fathers” conceived a revolutionary innovation: a permanent process of inter-governmental negotiations that have induced the forsaking of solitary national destinies in favour of a shared destiny. The EU today is characterized by two processes: enlargement and deepening. The combination of these two processes has made it possible to mesh diverse political and economic interests, over many years, to forge a common destiny. This is a unique experience that has no comparable counterpart in any other region in the world.

Enlargement has geographically extended the EU project through negotiated adherence to EU rules, and internal incorporation of the *acquis communautaire*. Each enlargement has required a challenging

economic competences from the Member States to the institutions of the EU. For political theorists, deepening is a novelty on two levels: in the classical analysis of the division of powers; and in the techniques of distributing competences based on federalism. The originality of the European institutions lies in three aspects: the governments’ acceptance of common values; the powers used in the service of those values; and the autonomy given to the institutions to implement those values.

No one should underestimate the dilemmas the EU faces today, both in moving ahead with its processes and building upon what it has already achieved. And all this in a world that is very different from the one that existed in 1957. However, as seen from Brazil and Latin America, the European experience of consolidating peace and prosperity under the rule of law is, from a Kantian perspective, a sign of the possibilities for progress in human affairs. Because of its political identity, and its worldwide impact, the European Union is a force for peace, human rights, diplomacy and multilateralism. That is why the EU can be called an international public good.



The signature of the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957

search for a new political equilibrium. Undoubtedly the EU of 27 represents a different and more complex challenge than the several previous ones that led from the Europe of 6 to that of 15. However, the incorporation of new members from Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War has consolidated democracy and the rule of law in Europe. As such it is a contribution to peace and stability that goes beyond Europe, and has a positive effect in a world of manifold tensions.

Deepening represents a continuous strengthening of European integration. This process has steadily transferred eco-

The preservation of this international public good is indispensable, if only for asserting a Kantian vision in a world that is currently strongly Hobbesian with some Grotian elements. This will require European leaders to both pacify and innovate without destabilising. To recall the French philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenal they must combine the *rex* dimension of conciliation and the *dux* dimension of change. EU leaders have to promote a new vision, building on what exists, to guarantee the sustainable development of this international public good. This vision represents the wishes and expectations of sincere friends of Europe from abroad.