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EDITORIAL



Álvaro de Vasconcelos DIRECTOR

LEÇONS DE LA RÉVOLUTION EUROPÉENNE: 1989-2009

Lors de la chute du Mur de Berlin, il y a vingt ans, bon nombre de craintes ont refait surface, et les sombres présages n'ont pas manqué sur un dramatique retour de l'histoire sous la forme d'une résurrection du rêve hégémonique allemand. Telle était la pensée des eurosceptiques, convaincus que l'intégration européenne n'était finalement qu'une utopie dangereuse tôt ou tard vouée à l'échec, incapable de s'imposer à l'immuable pulsion des nations, attribuée non à la volonté des citoyens mais à la force vitale déterminée par le poids de leur géographie, leur culture et leur histoire.

En dépit de tels pronostics, la réunification n'a rien changé ni à la détermination de l'Allemagne à l'égard de la construction européenne ni à l'attachement des Allemands à une culture politique pacifique et anti-hégémonique. La fin de l'empire soviétique, et de l'URSS, la refonte de la carte politique de l'Europe au bénéfice des révolutions démocratiques se sont faites, elles aussi, de façon largement pacifique, où les seules tragiques exceptions ont été l'éclatement de la Yougoslavie et les conflits dans le Caucase.

Partant d'un constat tout à fait semblable, tous deux préoccupés des conséquences du « tsunami » que représentait la désintégration du monde soviétique pour l'équilibre européen, Margaret Thatcher et François Mitterrand réagirent aux événements de 1989 de façon complètement différente. Ce qui les séparait : l'idéal européen. Thatcher, qui ne croyait pas à l'intégration européenne, était persuadée que la réunification de l'Allemagne ne pouvait que causer la rupture de l'équilibre européen. Mitterrand, européiste convaincu, soutenait que le retour des vieux conflits entre puissances européennes n'était pas inévitable à condition d'accélérer l'intégration européenne. Le 25 octobre 1989, le président français tenait déjà des propos dans ce sens : « C'est l'accélération, c'est le renforcement de la construction communautaire de l'Europe qui contribuera de façon éminente à une évolution positive de l'Est. Non seulement nous nous doterons de moyens supérieurs, notre Communauté passera d'un stade à un stade supérieur, mais encore il existera une attraction plus forte sur le reste de l'Europe. » Pour être à la hauteur de l'extraordinaire événement de 1989,


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il fallait y réagir par l'approfondissement des liens communautaires et la création de nœuds d'amarrage encore plus forts entre l'Allemagne et ses voisins. Tel était également le point de vue des Américains, acteurs de la construction européenne dès ses balbutiements.

Pour le président Bush père et son secrétaire d'Etat James Baker, la réunification allemande et le succès de la révolution démocratique en cours en Europe dépendaient de la vitalité de la Communauté, de sa capacité à continuer à renouer dans les faits « its continued commitment to the goal of a united Europe envisaged by its founders – free, democratic and closely linked to its North American partner ». Il n'était pas question alors de la vieille et de la nouvelle Europe, mais de l'Europe toute entière : unie et libre.

Rétrospectivement, la question allemande ne semblait pas d'actualité en 1989. Les citoyens et la classe politique de la République fédérale d'Allemagne étaient au moins aussi européistes que leurs voisins à l'Ouest. Selon la formule du chancelier Helmut Kohl, si « l'Allemagne est notre mère patrie, l'Europe est notre futur ». L'intégration européenne était définie comme intérêt vital des Allemands, qui avaient en effet tiré exactement les mêmes leçons des guerres fratricides européennes que l'on retirait chez leur grand voisin, la France. Kohl a souhaité que la réunification de l'Allemagne se fasse au centre des communautés européennes, dans le cadre d'un consensus avec la France. Les Allemands ont soutenu sa large vision en acceptant le remplacement de la monnaie dont ils étaient si fiers par l'euro. Ils ont également encouragé toutes les avancées vers l'union politique qui ont permis le traité de Maastricht et les réformes subséquentes.

Ceux qui ne craignaient pas la réunification de l'Allemagne étaient sûrs que les Allemands, en 1989, avaient tiré toutes les leçons des années 1930. Le président de la Commission européenne, Jacques Delors, affirmait en octobre 1990 que la réunification

de l'Allemagne était une opportunité pour une politique plus efficace en Europe de l'Est et un atout considérable pour le pouvoir d'attraction des Communautés. En effet, le succès économique de l'Allemagne occidentale a inspiré la réflexion de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev sur le besoin de procéder à des réformes et de lancer la perestroïka dans l'URSS qui accusait un retard économique considérable, tout comme les autres pays de l'Europe de l'Est.

une condition essentielle à la réussite de la transition démocratique. Pour cela, il importe de mettre à la disposition de ces transformations des moyens aussi considérables que ceux attribués à la BERD et aux élargissements. La stratégie d'inclusion démocratique, avec la politique d'élargissement, a été le meilleur instrument de la politique extérieure de l'Union européenne.



Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand (1990)

Vingt ans plus tard, il est clair que la réaction de la communauté internationale à la chute du Mur s'est soldée par un immense succès : la démocratisation et l'intégration de l'Europe (presque) toute entière. La Russie, tentée un moment par la Maison commune esquissée par Gorbatchev, a choisi de s'affirmer en tant que « pôle » autonome du système européen.

Aujourd'hui, il importe de réfléchir aux raisons de ce succès en tirant des leçons pour l'avenir. Un élément essentiel a été de comprendre que la prospérité est

Le succès de la démocratisation et de l'intégration du continent européen, du Portugal aux frontières de la Russie, résulte d'une sage combinaison d'intégration économique et de conditionnalité politique. Cependant, sans sécurité, il n'y aurait pas eu de progrès dans l'inclusion démocratique. Les pays de l'ex-Yougoslavie ne seraient pas aujourd'hui sur la voie de l'adhésion s'il n'y avait pas eu, après de tragiques hésitations, une réponse militaire ferme à l'extrémisme nationaliste.

Deux décennies plus tard, on peut affirmer que l'entente franco-allemande est une condition nécessaire mais pas suffisante pour le succès des politiques européennes. Il est nécessaire de mobiliser les autres Etats de l'Union, de faire appel à leurs atouts et de respecter leurs droits. Cette question, après les élargissements, est particulièrement pertinente du fait de la diversité des expériences historiques et des nouveaux Etats membres, ce qui rend le consensus européen moins automatique

mais pas moins nécessaire.

Ce que sera l'Europe dans les vingt prochaines années est difficile à prévoir, mais son futur dépendra certainement de l'ambition de ceux qui la dirigent aujourd'hui et notamment de la capacité des Etats les plus riches à continuer à manifester leur solidarité vis-à-vis de ceux qui ont des difficultés. C'est pourquoi l'avenir de l'Europe paraît aujourd'hui lié à la façon dont l'Union sera capable de répondre à ceux qui, sur son territoire et dans son voisinage, souffrent le plus lourdement des conséquences de la crise économique et financière.

ESDP @ 10**Brussels, 28 July 2009**

This event, marking 10 years of the European Security and Defence Policy, was held in conjunction with the Swedish presidency of the EU. It was also the occasion for the launch of the Institute's publication *What ambitions for European defence in 2020?*

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Helen Clark



Javier Solana, Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Carl Bildt.

Implications of the economic crisis for enlargement and neighbourhood**Warsaw, 19 June 2009**

This working group was organised in cooperation with Collegium Civitas and Demos EUROPA. Looking at current challenges in both the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, this event served also as a preparatory meeting for the EUISS's Annual Conference in October.

EU/NATO and the Turkish contribution to ESDP**Ankara 17-18 May 2009**

Participants from Turkey and the EU discussed the potential role for Turkey in ESDP, including frameworks for cooperation.

Afghanistan: A regional approach**Paris, 4 May 2009**

The Institute brought together experts and officials from countries neighbouring Afghanistan, as well as from Turkey, India, China and the EU, in order to analyse prospects for a genuine regional strategy to stabilise Afghanistan.



Seminar participants 'Afghanistan: A regional approach'

Summer School: European security culture and national traditions**Cambridge, 14-17 July 2009**

The Institute held its first ever summer school in Cambridge on 14-17 July 2009, bringing together young researchers to discuss European security culture. The school was attended by participants from 25 EU Member States, and one participant each from the EU's Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods.



Participants at the summer school

The impact of the economic crisis on developing countries: which global policies?**New York, 18 September 2009**

Following a luncheon with a keynote address by Helen Clark, Administrator of the UNDP, with the participation of several Permanent Representatives to the United Nations and Joseph Stiglitz, the meeting of this Annual Conference preparatory working group - organized in cooperation with the Portuguese Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs - stressed the links between the different aspects of the development agenda (security, social development, negotiations on climate change) and the enhanced need, at the global governance level, for comprehensive approaches on fragile states.

Current developments in post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction**Bucharest, 27-28 April 2009**

The prospects for recovery and sustainable development of a post-conflict country depend to a great extent on the initial phase of the national and international response. This conference, organised with the Romanian foreign ministry and the European Commission, looked at how international post-conflict reconstruction efforts can be improved. Participants discussed conceptual, legal and institutional frameworks as well as technical considerations such as coordination, planning and coherence.



Stefan Tinca

The European Union and the Mediterranean: the political agenda for 2010**Brussels, 24 April 2009**

This meeting covered bilateral dynamics and multilateral perspectives, Euro-Med cooperation and protracted conflicts in the region, participation of all political actors, and areas for cooperation on security. It also included a lunch debate on the new American policy towards the Israel-Palestine conflict.



Robert Malley

Change in Washington: new momentum for US-EU relations**Paris, 6 April 2009**

This seminar took place during US President Barack Obama's first official visit to Europe, after the G20 London summit, the NATO Strasbourg/Kehl summit, and the EU-US meeting including the President's address on nuclear disarmament in Prague, on the day of Obama's visit to Turkey. Consequently, the bulk of discussions focused on the transatlantic agenda and on the question of what change can be expected in transatlantic relations with the new US administration. The seminar also addressed the policies in Afghanistan and the Middle East Peace Process.

What ambitions for European defence in 2020?

Book, July 2009

edited by **Álvaro de Vasconcelos** with a preface by **Javier Solana**



This volume seeks to define Europe's long-term security and defence ambitions, and to examine how these ambitions might translate into policies. It concludes with a ten-point 'roadmap to 2020' based on the premise that the European Union needs to build both a robust civilian and military capacity on the foundations of what has already been achieved while addressing a deficit in policy coherence and consistency, and capability.

The book features chapters by the following authors: C.-F. Arnould, J. Auvinen, H. Bentégeat, N. Gnesotto, J. Howorth, F. S. Larrabee, T. Ries, J. Saryusz-Wolski, S. Silvestri, A. Stubb, N. Severiano Teixeira, Á. de Vasconcelos, A. Weis and R. Wright.

No Euro-Mediterranean Community without peace

by **Muriel Asseburg** and **Paul Salem**

This paper looks at the prospects for Euro-Mediterranean initiatives against the current troubled backdrop of the Middle East, and in particular the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Clearly, the long-term objective of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Community will not be fulfilled without a lasting peace in the region. The authors put forward a set of proposals on how Europe should contribute to resolving the Middle East crisis.

Risky business: the EU, China and dual-use technology

Occasional Paper N°80, September 2009

May-Britt Stumbaum

The author argues that it is high time for the European Union to adopt a proactive policy of managing the risks of sensitive technology transfer to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The European Union can optimise benefits from opportunities available in the promising and technologically rapidly advancing Chinese market.

EU Security and Defence: Core Documents 2008, Volume IX

Chaillot Paper N°117, July 2009

compiled by Catherine Glière

Available in English and in French, this volume presents official documents on European security and defence, including statements, decisions and other material from the relevant EU structures.

The inter-polar world: a new scenario

Occasional Paper N°79, June 2009

Giovanni Grevi

Giovanni Grevi sketches out a new scenario for the changing international system: the inter-polar world. He suggests that the shifts in global power will be shaped by the necessities of increasing interdependence – not least in confronting shared challenges, from the economic crisis to climate change, and their political and security implications. Inter-polarity is multipolarity in the age of interdependence.

War crimes, conditionality and EU integration in the Western Balkans

Chaillot Paper N°116, June 2009

Vojin Dimitrijevic, Florence Hartmann, Dejan Jovic, Tija Memisevic, edited by Judy Batt and Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik

The political conditions for opening the path towards EU integration for the countries of the Western Balkans include both full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and regional reconciliation. This paper examines the extent to which this strategy has worked, looking at questions of leadership and political will, as well as the place that EU integration takes on national agendas.

Maghreb : vaincre la peur de la démocratie

Cahier de Chaillot N°115, avril 2009

Luís Martínez

Le Maghreb est confronté à des défis colossaux : pauvreté, terrorisme, migration, corruption, violation des droits de l'homme. Les réformes nécessaires pour résoudre ces problèmes exigent un engagement des États avec le soutien de leur société civile : elles échoueront si elles ne sont pas portées par des dirigeants politiques légitimes, démocratiquement élus. Comme l'analyse Luís Martínez, la démocratisation au Maghreb doit devenir une priorité de la politique européenne en Méditerranée.

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New Research Fellow

Rouzbeh Parsi (Sweden/Iran)



arrived at the Institute as a Research Fellow in June. Previously he was at Lund University where he participated in the creation of, and teaching on, the interdisciplinary Human Rights programme (2003-2009). At the Institute, Rouzbeh Parsi deals with politics and governance in Iran, Iraq and the Persian Gulf.

New publications series

10 Papers for Barcelona 2010


The *10 Papers for Barcelona 2010* is a new series addressing ten critical topics for Euro-Mediterranean relations published jointly by the EUISS and the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed). The purpose is to formulate policy options on a set of issues central to achieving the aims jointly stated in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration: primarily, building a common Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability founded on the rule of law. It is hoped that the insights and policy proposals provided by a variety of experts will help shape the decisions that must be taken by the international community and the EU in particular in order to achieve progress.

Forthcoming Book

**European Security and Defence Policy
The first 10 years (1999 - 2009)**

This EUISS book, edited by Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane, analyses the first ten years of ESDP, from 1999 to 2009. The book is divided into two parts. Part one assesses the development of ESDP institutions, resources and partnerships.

Part two contains chapters analysing every ESDP operation to date.





BRIDGING AN UNNECESSARY DIVIDE: NATO AND THE EU

European integration is a project of peace, stability and development. The European Union (EU) is its embodiment. It is based on shared values and the conviction that a better future is possible and will be of our making. It is a project that succeeded. This makes it a source of attraction for others who want to join this project. We aspire to full membership of the EU because of what it actually stands for. A strong European Security and Defence Policy is an important element of this project, a tool for bringing peace and stability to other parts of the globe.

NATO, on the other hand, is our 'transatlantic house' for providing us with the necessary environment for taking our projects further for a better future. It has provided us with security and defence and it remains the core of all the Allies' national defence policies – including those who are EU members. Being together with our American friends in this endeavour is an invaluable contribution for what we aim for. NATO has also become eventually our way of providing more of what we have – peace and stability – to other regions of the world.

I see a strong convergence of values and goals of these two organisations. They are not and cannot be expected to be in competition with each other. Moreover, their membership coincides to a large extent, thus providing two very important means for almost the same countries to work in different ways for the same objectives. However, the relationship is far away from being seamless or complete. The difference in the membership composition of NATO and the EU and the prevailing political problems have been complicating the essential cooperation between NATO and the EU. Hopefully, these will be overcome when European integration is complete and solutions will then be found to the satisfaction of all. Until that time, making NATO and the EU work together is a responsibility for all of us.

We cannot let the current problems hinder what can be of benefit to the EU, NATO or the NATO-EU relationship. For NATO-EU relations, we have established an agreed set of modalities for cooperation. During this 'transition' period, these modalities cannot be allowed to fall apart. They remain to be our *modus vivendi*. We made them work well in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by letting

the EU use NATO assets. We should also allow these very same modalities to work their way through in regions like Kosovo and Afghanistan where we, as NATO and the EU, are present on the ground simultaneously. This approach is surely not about being 'theological', but 'pragmatic' as some frequently ask for: We have to make NATO and the EU work together on the basis of the current situation. France's taking its full place in NATO will surely help the two organisations work closer. In that sense, I am more than ever hopeful about the future.

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Flag production for the Romania Nato summit

Yet a very important piece of this puzzle is still missing: the difficulties of non-EU Allies in contributing to the common endeavour of the European Security and Defence Policy. Will the future bring us solutions which will help us to go beyond the existing means?

The answer will lie in the degree of openness, transparency and the desire to work together in security and defence affairs. This is succinctly referred to as the 'comprehensive approach'. It is a requirement imposed by the security challenges of today. It calls for a coherent use of available tools within an organisation, be it UN, NATO or the EU, and an enhanced cooperation with the rest of the international actors.

NATO has developed very effective tools for making its co-operation work with countries contributing to its efforts. There has been a progressive development within NATO to provide annually reviewed mechanisms. It has been initially offered to Partners (Partnership for Peace), then expanded to other countries in different cooperation initiatives (Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative etc.) and finally to contact countries, willing to work with NATO from time to time with no formal relationship.

The European Union also established arrangements for co-operation with non-EU

Allies back in 2003. The EU, however, has focused more on its ability to coherently utilise its own tools and therefore neglected the need to enhance its cooperation with others. The ESDP suffers from this lack of cooperation; so do we as non-EU Allied partners of the ESDP. During the Georgian crisis, for example, we would have liked to hold consultations with the European Union. We made a request for this purpose, as a neighbouring non-EU Allied partner of the EU. We did not receive a favourable reply from the EU side. The European Union did not inform Turkey about the idea, when they decided to establish a European Air Fleet from A400M airplanes. We still lack an agreement for exchanging classified information with the EU and have yet to finalise an arrangement for establishing defence industry co-operation with the European Defence Agency.

In spite of such unfavourable conditions, we have still done our best to contribute to the European Security and Defence Policy activities: Turkey is the biggest non-EU contributor to the ESDP missions and operations, the third biggest contributor to Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a significant contributor to civilian and military capability development efforts. When the EU was conducting half of its missions and operations in the immediate neighbourhood of Turkey, we believe that we have assumed our share of the burden. As I attach great importance to a strong European role in defence and security affairs, I therefore would suggest that co-operation with a non-EU Ally in such cases will only render the European Security and Defence Policy stronger. If such a possibility is given, Turkey's involvement, as a capable European actor in security and defence affairs, will constitute a solid contribution.

Solidarity is key in security and defence affairs, when we co-operate with other members of the same organisation. Solidarity within NATO is not less important than solidarity within the EU and vice versa. Beyond these institutional boundaries, solidarity is essential among all concerned to make the NATO-EU relationship work and the ESDP stronger. Possible solutions have been proposed by some, including my country. Let us work on them for the benefit of all, let us keep our principles crystal clear. We have an obligation to work together and there are ways to do it.



FIRST STEPS: OBAMA AND THE FUTURE OF DISARMAMENT

Multilateral disarmament for non-conventional weapons is back on the political agenda for the first time in almost a decade. The Obama administration has spelt out its interest in negotiated arms reductions supported by verification measures – a concept the Bush administration had made all but taboo. The international community is responding. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has adopted an agenda of work for the first time in many years and despite the need to remove some more bumps along the road, negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) appears set to take off in earnest in January 2010. At the time of writing, Russia and the United States appear set to cut their respective nuclear delivery vehicles by two thirds and nuclear warheads

by one third from the levels allowed under the 2002 Moscow Treaty in a follow-on to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to be agreed before its expiration on 5 December. The United Nations Security Council, meeting on the level of Heads of State and Government on 24 September and chaired by the US president, adopted Resolution 1887 to set out a path towards nuclear disarmament and strengthen international nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

On the surface, Obama appears to have picked up the thread where it had been dropped about 10-15 years ago. Nevertheless, his approach may be transformational. Initial successes with the US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the conclusion of the successor to START with Russia and a constructive outcome of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review conference in 2010 could pave the way for much more far-reaching initiatives later on. A holdout against the NPT, India has recently professed greater interest in joining the CTBT and a verifiable FMCT. Israel also signalled possible ratification of the CTBT. However, the Obama adminis-

tration's interest is wholly focused on nuclear weapon reductions; no statements on chemical and biological weapon issues have been made by the President or his senior cabinet members. Indeed, no high-level officials in the State Department or the White House have been appointed for those issue areas (in contrast to the Department for Homeland Security).

help to shape threat perceptions, and non-conventional weapons can be constructed in a myriad of new ways to suit a variety of human, societal or economic targets, the concepts of disarmament and verification need to be radically reconceived. Their future relevance will largely depend on identifying their unique contribution to security in the present context as well as on the design and implementation of tools

and processes that are seen to offer more than marginal benefits to all parties concerned.

The international community cannot solely rely on the United States to achieve the transformation. Domestic politics can easily derail the process. Opposition tactics both within and outside Congress appear geared to upsetting the Obama

presidency irrespective of the actual merit of his policy proposals and efforts to reach out to the widest possible political spectrum. To be more precise: if the current healthcare reform initiative fails, disarmament and arms control initiatives (including CTBT ratification and the successor to START) may be less controversial and even enjoy a degree of bipartisan endorsement. Should the administration succeed in pushing through major healthcare reform, conservative forces are likely to concentrate their full fury on Obama's next signature policy initiative – possibly CTBT ratification – in the drive to hang the first big scalp from the Republican belt. While Obama can be given credit for putting his presidential shoulder under an idea that has been gaining ground for the past three years, other countries will need to put forward proposals that are simultaneously bold, innovative and concrete to shore up the present forward momentum, if only to prove to Americans that Obama's multilateral engagement and push for arms reductions yield major results that are beneficial to the United States.



Disarmament conference at the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, Saturday, March 7, 2009

Disarmament and arms control, as well as their associated tools and processes, were conceived during the Cold War as instruments to increase stability and transparency in superpower relations and prevent the inadvertent outbreak of war. Today the context in which to consider disarmament and arms control options has changed fundamentally: new security actors and partners have emerged; the bipolar world order has transitioned through a unipolar moment to a multipolar global system; a whole range of new – often non-military – security threats and issues that affect societies worldwide, including global warming, emerging and re-emerging diseases and the current economic downturn, overshadows the world; and, perhaps most importantly, economic activities are being organised and scientific research and technological development steered and applied in radically different ways. Whereas during the Cold War disarmament and arms control were a central security-enhancing tool, today they are but one of many instruments to address threats and challenges. As technologies for weapon development have become ubiquitous, security actors other than states

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